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Rule 1.12 A$A MOTEL RULL~
I$iJL~, 1.130 ~R~GAN~ZATIOIV AS CLIENT
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organizatio
n
represents the organization acti~tg through its d
uly authorized
constifiuents.
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an office
r,
employee ox other person associated wiEh the organ
ization
is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to 
act in a
matter related to the representation that is a viola
tion of a
legal obligation to the organization, oz a violat
ion of law that
reasonably might be imputed to the organizati
on, and that is
likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, 
then
the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessa
ry in the
best interest of the organization. iJnless the law
yer reasonably
believes that it is not necessary in the best interes
t of the
organization to do so, the lawyer shall arefer the mat
ter to
higher authority in the organization, including
, i£ waxranted
by the circumstances, to the highest authority t
hat can act an
behalf o£ the organization as determined by ap
plicable law.
(c) Except as provided in paragzaph (d), if
(1) despite the lawyer's effoxts in accordance with
paragraph (b? the highest authority that can act on beh
alf of
the organization insists upon or fails to address i
n a timely
and appropriate manner an action ox a refusal to 
act, that is
clearly a violation of law; and
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violat
ion
is reasonably certain to resiXlt in substantial i
njury to the
organization,
then the lawyer may reveal information relating 
to the
representation whether or not R111e 1.6 permits 
sucks disclosure,
68
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CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP Rule 1.13
but only if and to tl~e extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary to pxevent substantial injury to the organization.
(d) Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information
relating to a lawyer's representation of an organization to
investigate an alleged violation of law, ox to defend the
organization or an officer, employee or other constituent
associated with the organization against a claim arising
ottt of an alleged violation of Iaw.
(e) A lawyex who reasonably believes that he or she has been
discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to
paragraphs (b) or (c), ox who withdraws under circumstances
that require ox permit the lawyer to take action under either of
those paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary to assure that the organizatzon's highest authority is
informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.
(f) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers,
employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer
shall explain the identity of the client when Ehe lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse
to Ehose of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.
(g) A lawyer representing an organization may also represenE
any of .its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders
or other constituents, subject to the provisions of .Rule 1.7. I£ the
organization's consent to the dual repxesentation is regixired by
Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official
of fhe organization other than the individual who is to be
represented, or by the shareholders.
Comment
The Entity cis the Client
[1] ~1n organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except
through its officers, directors, employees, shareholders and othex con-
stituents. Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the con-
stituents of the corporate organizational client. The duties defined r.n this
Comment apply equally to unincorporated associations. "Other constitu-
ents" as used in this Connment means the positions equivalent to officers,
directors, employees and shareholders held by persons acting for organi-
zational clients that are not corporations.
[2] When one of the constituents of an organizational client com-
municates with the arganization's lawyer in that person's organizatioizal
69
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Rule 1.13 ASA MODEL RULES
capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.6. Thus, by way of
example, i£ an organizational client requests its lawyer to investigate al-
legations of wrongdoing, interviews made in fhe course of that investiga-
tion between the lawyer and the client's employees or other constituents
are covered by Rule 1.6. This does not mean, however, that constituents
of an oz•ganizational client ire the clients of the 1lwyer. The lawyer may
not disclose to such cozlstituents information relating to the representa-
tion except for disclosures explicitly or impliedly authorized by tkze orga-
nizational client in order to carry out the representation or as otherwise
pen~nitted by Rule 1.6.
[3] When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the
decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility
or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and operations, in-
cludzng ones entailing serious risk, are not 1s such in the lawyer's prov-
ince. Paragraph (b) makes clear, howevez; that when the lawyer knows
that the organization is likely to be substantially injured by action of an
officer or other constituent that violates a legal obligation to the organiza-
tion or is in violation of la~n~ that might be imputed to the organization,
the lawyer must proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest
of the organization. As defined in Rule 1.0(f), knowledge can be inferred
from circumstances, and a lawyer cannot igzloa~e the obvio~.is.
[4] In determining how to proceed under paragraph (b), the lawyer
should give due consideration to the seriousness of the violltion and its
consequences, the. responsibility in the organization and the app~xent
motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization con-
cerning such matters, and any othex relevant considerations. Ordinarily,
referral to a higher authority would be necessary. I.n some circumstances,
however, it may be appropriate fox the lawyer to ask the constituent to
reconsidex the matter; for example, if the circumstances involve a con-
stituent's innocent misunderstanding of law and subsequent acceptance
of the lawyer's advice, the Dwyer may reasonably conclude that the best
interest of the organization does not require that the mater be referred to
higher authority. If a constituent persists in conduct contrary to the law-
yer's advice, it will be necessary for the lawyer to take steps to have the
mater reviewed by a higher authority in the organization. If the matter is
of sufficient seriousness and importance or urgency to the organization,
referral to higher authority in the organization may be necessary even if
the lawyer has not communicated with the constituent. Any measures
taken should, to the extent practicable, minimize the risk of revealing
70
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CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP Role 1.13
informatio~.1 relating to the representltion to persons outside the organi-
zation. Even in circumstances where a lawyer is not obligated by Rule
"t.13 to proceed, a lawyer may bring to the attention o£ an organizational
client, including its highest authority, matters that the Dwyer reasonably
believes to be of sixfficient importance to warrant doing so in the best in-
terest of d1e organizatiozz.
[5] Paragraph (b) also makes clear that when it is reasonably nec-
essary to enable the organization to address the matter i.n a timely Ind
appropriate mariner, the lawyer must refer the mater to higher authority,
including, if warranted by the circumstances, the highest authority that
can act oz1 behalf of the organization under applicable law. The organi-
zation's highest authority to whom a matter may be referred ordinarily
will be the board of directors or similar governing body. However, ap-
plicable law may prescribe that under certaizl conditions the highest au-
thority reposes elsewhere, for example, in the independent directors of a
corporatioiz.
Relation to Other Rules
[6] The authority and responsibility provided in this Rule are con-
curren.t with the authority and responsibility provided. in other Rules. In
particular, this Rule does not limit or expand the lawyer's responsibility
under Rules 1.8, 1.16, 3.3 or 4.1. Paragraph (c) of this Rule sLipplernents
Rule 1.6(b) by providing an additional basis upon which the lawyez• may
reveal I21f0YTYldt1011 relating to the representation, but does not modify,
restrict, or limit the provisions of Rule 1.6(b)(1) — (6). Under paragraph
(c) the lawyer may reveal such information only when the organization's
highest authority insists upon or fails to address threatened or onguiz~g
action that is clearly a violation of law, Ind then only to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain sub-
stantial injury to the organization. It is not necessary that the lawyer's
services be used in. furtherance of the violation, but it is required that the
matter be related to the lawyer's representation of the organization. I£ the
lawyer's services are being used by an organization to further a crime or
fraud by the organization, Rules 1.6(b)(2) and 1.6(b)(3) rxlay permit the
lawyer to disclose confidential infoz~mation. In such circumstances Rule
1.2(d) may also be applicable, in which event, withdrawal from the repre-
sentation under Rule 1.16(a)(1) may be .required.
[7) Paragraph (cl) makes clear that the authority of ~ 1lwyer to dis-
close information relating to a representation in circumstances described
71
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in paragraph (c) does not apply with respect to in
farination relating to a
lawyer's enna~;ement by an orgaxlization to 
investigate an alleged viola-
tion of law oz~ to defezld the organization or a
n officer, em~?layee oz other
person associated with the or7~z~ization aga
inst a claim arisizlg out of an
alleged violation of law. This is necessary
 in order to enable organiza-
tional clients to enjoy the fu~l.l benefits of legal counse
l in conducting an
invesrihatiozz o.r defending a~,aii~st a claim.
[8] A lawyez• who reasonably believes that he 
o~r she 11as been dis-
ch~rged because of the Lawyer's actions 
taken pursuant to paragraph
(b) or (c), or who withdraws in circumstances t
hat require oz permit the
lawyer to tale action undex either of these
 p~r~gra~hs, must proceed as
the l~wyei~ reasonably believes necessary to
 assure that the organization s
highest authority is infoz-med of the lawyer's
 discharge or withdrawal.
GoveYnrrient agency
(9) The duty defi.~zed in this Rule applies to g
overnmental organiza-
tions. Defining precisely the identity of tk~e 
client and prescribing the re-
sulting obligations o£ such lawyers may be m
ore difficult in the govern-
ment context and is a matter beyond the scope
 of these Rules. See Scope
[18]. Although in some circumstances the client 
zn~y be a specific agency,
it may also be a br~ncll of government, such
 as the executive branch, or
the government as a whole. Por exampl
e, if the action or failure to act
involves the head of a bureau, either the de
partment of which the bureau
is a part or the relevant branch of governm
ent may be the client for pur-
poses of this Ru.te. Moreover, in a matter in
volving the conduct of gov-
ernment offici~]s, a government 11~~yer may have
 ~trthority under appli-
c~ble law to question such conduct more ex
tensively than that o£ a lawyer
for a private oxganiz~tion in similar circum
stances. Thus, when the client
is a governmental organization, a different ba
lance may be appropriate
between znaizztaining confidentiality and assu
ring that the wrongful act is
prevented or rectified, for public business is i
nvolved. In addition, duties
of lawyers employed by the government 
or lawyers in military service
may be defined by statutes and regtll~tion. Thi
s Rule does not 1zmit that
authority. See Scope.
Clarifying tJae ~,aw~eY'.s IZo1e
[10] There are times when the organization's in
terest may be or be-
come adverse to those of one or more of
 its constituents. In such circum-
stances the lawyer should advise any const
ituent, wtiuse interest the law-
72
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yer finds adverse to that of the organization of the conflict or potentialcozzflzct of izlterest, that the lawye~~ cannot represent sudz constituent, andthat such person may wish to obtain independent representatzon. Caremust be taken to assuxe that the individual understands that, when therezs such adversity of interest, the lawyer for the organization cannot pzo-vide legal representation for that constituent individual, and that discus-sions between the lawyer for the organization and the individcial znaynot be privileged.
[11] Whether such a warning should be given by the lawyer. fox theorganization to any constituent individual may turn on the facts of eachcase.
17uct1 ~Zep~esentcztion
[12J Parlgraph (g) recognizes that a lawyer for an organization mayalso represent a principal officer ox major shareholder.
Derivative Actions
[13] Under generally prevailing law, the shareholders or membersof a corporation may bring suit to compel the directors to perform their 
~,legal obligations in the supervision of the organization. Members of un-incorporated associations have essentially the same right. Such an action {may be brought nominally by the organzzation, but usually is, in fact, alegal controversy over management of the organization.[14] The question can arzse whether colulsel for the organization ±'may defend such an action. The proposition that the organization is thelawyer's client does nit alone resolve the issue. Mist derivative actionsire a normal incident of an organization's affaixs, to be defended by theorganization's lawyer like any other suit. However, if the daizn involvesserious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of the organization,a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to the oxganization andthe lawyer's relationship with the board. In those circumstances, Rule 1.7governs who should represent the directors and the organization.
Iaefini~ioxaal Cross-~Zefere~~~s
"T<nows" See Rule 1.0(f)
"12easonably" See Rule 1.0(h)
"Reasonably believes" See Rule 1.0(i)
"Reasonzlbly should know" See Rule 1.0(j)
"Subsiantiai" See Rule 1.0(1)
73
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IZiJL~ ~e1~> ~~1T~ES 'I'O I~Y~OSI'~CT~~IE ~~,IEI~d'~'
(a3 ~ person tvho consulEs with a la~nryer abouf the possibiXity
of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a mafiter
is a prospective client.
(b) Eves when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, a lawyer
who has learned information frmrzl a prospective client shall not
use or reveal fihat information, excep4 as Rule 1.9 would permit
with respect to information of a former clieztt.
(c) A tav~ryer subject to paragraph (b) shall nat represent a
clienE wzth interests materially adverse to those of a prospective
client in the same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer
received information from the pxospective client that could
be significantly haimf~ll to that person Xn the matter, except
as provided in paragraph (d). if a lawyex is disqualified froze
representation under this paragxapke, no lawyex in a firm wzth
which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undextake or
continue representation in such a rna4ter, except as provided in
paragraph (d).
(d) When the lawyer leas received disqualifying infor7mation
as defined in paxagraph (c), representation is permissible if:
(1) both fhe affected client aa~d the prospective clienf have
given infoxxneci consent, cozafirmed in writznb; or:
(2) the lawyer who received the information took
reasonable meastares to avoid exg~~su-re to snore disquali~fyirig
information than was reasonably necessary to c(etermine
whether to represent Ehe p~'ospective client; and
(i) the dzsqualifiecl lawyer is timely screened. from any
participation in tl~e matter end is appoxtxorecd no p~r~ of
Ehe fee therefrom; ared
(ii) written notice is prar~a,ptdg~ given to the prospects=re
client.
Cornz~.e~t
[1] Prospective clients, like clients, may disclose information to ~ law-
yer, place documents or other property in the lawyer's custody, or rely on
the lawyer's advice. A lawyer's consultations with a prospective client
usually are 1zmitecl in time and depth and leave both the prospective cli-
ent anal the lawyer free (and sometimes required) to proceed no further..
Hence, prospective clients should receive some but not all of the protec-
tion afforded clients.
m
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[2] A person becomes a prospective client by consulting with a law-
yer about the possibility of forming aclient-lawyer relationship with re-
spect to a matter. Whether communications, including written, oral, or
electronic communications, constitute a consultation depends on the cir-
cumstances. Por example, a consultation is likely to have occurred if a
lawyer, either in person or through the lawyer's advertising in any me-
dium, specifically requests or invites the submission of informaEion about
a potential representation without clear and reasonably understandable
warnings and cautionary statements that limit the lawyer's obligations,
and a person provides information in response. See also Comment [4]. In
contrlst, a consultation does not occur if ~ person provides information
to a lawyer in response to advertising that merely describes the lawyer's
education, experience, areas of practice, and contact information, or pro-
vides legal information of general interest. Such a person communicates
information unilaterally to a lawyer, withoLrt any reasonable expectation
that the lawyer is willing to discuss the possibility of forming a client-
lawyer relationship, and is thus not ~ "prospective client." Moreover, 1
person who communicates with a lawyez for the purpose o£ d.isqualif
y-
ing the lawyez is not a "prospective client."
[3J It is often necessary for a prospective client to reveal information
\ to the lawyer during an initial consultation prior t
o the decision about
formation of aclient-lawyer relltionship. The lawyer often must learn
such information to determine whether there is a conflict of interest with
an existing client and whether the matter is one that the lawyer is willing
to undertake. Paragraph (b) prohibits the lawyer £rom using or reveal-
ing that information, except ~s permitted by Rule 1.9, even if t11e client
or Dwyer decides not to proceed with the representation. The duty exists
regardless of how brief the initial conference may be.
[4~ In order to avoid acquiring disqualifying information from a pro-
spective client, a lawyer considering whether ox not to undertake a new
matter should limit the initill consuitltion to only such information as
reasonably appears necessary £ox that purpose. Where the information
indicates that a conflict of interest or other reason for non-representati
on
exists, the lawyer should so inform the prospective client or decline the
representation. If the prospective client wishes to retain the lawyer, and if
consent is possible under Rule 1.7, then consent from all affected present
or former clients miLst be obtained before accepting the representation.
j5] A lawyer zriay condition a consultation with a prospective client
on the person's informed consent that no information disclosed during
;,
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CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP Rule 1.18
the consultation will prohibit the lawyer froze represezlting a different cli-ent in the matter. See Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent.If the agreement expz~essly so provides, the prospective client may alsoconsent to the lawyer's subsequent use of information received froze theprospective client.
[6] Even in the absence of an agreement, cinder paragraph (c), thelawyer is not prohibited from representing a client with interests adverseto those of the prospective client in the same or a substantially related
matter unless the Iawyer has received from the prospective client infor-
mation that could be significantly harmful if used in the matter.(7) Under paragraph (c), the prohibition iz~ this Rule is imputed to
other lawyers as provided in Rule 110, but, under paragraph (d)(1), im-putation may be avoided if the lawyer obtains the informed consent,
confirmed in writing, of both the prospective and affected clients. In the
alternative, imputation may be avoided if the conditions of paxagraph(d)(2) are met and all disqualified i~wyers are tzmely screened and writ-ten notice is promptly given to the prospective client. See Rule 7.0(k) (re-quirements for screening procedures). Para~r~ph (d)(2)(i) does not pro-hibit the screened lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share
established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may not
receive compensation directly related to the matter in which the 1lwyer isdisqualified.
[8) Notice, including 1 general description of the subject matter about
which the lawyex was consulted, and of the screening procedures em-ployed, gener111y should be given as soon as practicable after the needfox screening becomes apparent.
[9) For the duty of coinpetertce of a lawyer who gives assistance nn
the nnerits of a matter to a pz~ospective client, see Rule 1.1. For a lawyer'sduties when a prospective client entrusts valuables or papers to the law-yer's care, see Rule 1.15.
Definitional Cross-Refec~ences
"Confirmed in writing" See Rule 1.0(b)
"Firm" See Rule 1.0(c)
"Informed Consent" See Rule 1.0(e)
"Knowingly" See Rule 1.0(£)
"Reasonable" and "Reasonably" See Rule 1.0(h)
"Screened" See Rule 1.0(k)
"Written" See Rule 1.0(n)
89
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TZULE 2.1: ADVISOR
In repxesenting a client, a lawyer shall
 exercise
independent professioa~al judgment and rende
r candid advice.
In rendering advice, a lawyer may refe
x not only to Iaw buE
to otk~er considexations such as moral, 
economic, soci~] and
political Factors, that xnay be retevant t
o the client's situation.
Comrztez~t
Scope of Advice
[Z] A client is entitled to straightforw~xd 
advice expressing the Iaw-
yer's honest assessment. Legal advice
 often involves unpleasant facts
lnct alternatives that a client may be d
isinclined to confront. In present-
ing advrce, a lawyer endeavors to susta
in the client's morale and may put
advice in as acceptable a form as hon
esty permits. However, a lawyer
should not be deterred £rom gicring u
ndid advzce by the prospect that
the advice will be unpalatable to the c
lient.
[2] Advice couched in narrow legal terms 
xnay be of 1zttle value to ~
client, especi~ily where practical consid
erations, such as cost or effects on
other people, are predominant. Purely
 technical legal advice, therefore,
can sometimes be inadequate. It is pxop
er for a lawyer to refer to relevant
moral and etk~acal considerations in givin
g advice. Although a lawyer is
not a moral advisor ~s such, moral an
d ethical considerations impinge
upon most legal questions and may dec
isively influence how the law will
be 1ppzied.
[3] A client r ay expressly or impliediy a
sk the Iawyer for purely
technical advice. When such a request is
 made by a client experienced in
legal matters, the lawyer may accept it 
at face value. When s~,ich a request
is made by a client inexperienced in l
egal matters, however, the lawyer's
responsibility as advisor may include i
ndicating that more may be in-
volved than strictly legal considerativris.
[4] Matters that go beyond strictly .legal qu
estions may also be in
the domain of another profession. Plm
ily matters can involve problems
wifihin the professional competence of
 psychiatry, clinical psychology
or soczal work; business matters can 
revolve problems within the com-
petence of the accounting profession or
 of financial specialzsts. Where
consultation with a professional in an
other field is itself soz~ething a
90
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competent lawyer tivoLil.d recommend, the l~wycr should male such 1recommendation. At the same time, a l~~vyer's advice a# its best oftezzconsists of recommending a course of action in the face of conflicting rec-ommendations of experts.
offering ,Advice
j5] ~n general, a lawyer is xlot expected to give advice until asked bythe client. However, when a lawyer knows that a client proposes a courseof action that is likely to result iz1 substantial adverse leg~1 consequencesto the client, the lawyer's duty to the client under Rule "1.4 may requiz~ethat the lawyer offer advice if the client's course of action is related to therepresentation. Similarly, when a matter is likely to involve Iitigation, itmay be necessaxy under .Rule 1.4 to rnfoxm the client of forms of dzsputeresolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to litigation. Alawyer ordinarily has no duty to initiate investigation o£ a diem`s affairsor to give advice that the client has indicted is unwanted, btrt a lawyermay initiate advice to a client when doing so appears to be in the diem'sinterest.
91
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.ADVOCATE
RULE 301: MERITORIOUS
CLAIMS AND CONTENTIONS
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, oz assert
or controvert an .iss~~e therein, unless there is a basis in law and
£act for doing so that is not Frivolous, which includes a good faith
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing
law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the
respondent in a proceeding that could result in inclrceration,
I may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to 
require that
evezy element of the case be established.
Comment
[1] The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the Fullest
benefit o£ the client's caLrse, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedu
re.
The law, both proced~iral znd substantive, establishes the limits wiE
hin `°
which an advocate may proceed. However, the law is not always 
clear ==:
and zlever is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of ad- 
r
vocacy, account must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential
 fox i
change.
[2] The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken fora cli-
ent is not frivolous merely because the £acts have not first been fully s
ub- °
stantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidenc
e only
by discovery. What is required of lawyers, however, is that they infor
m
themselves about the facts of their clients' cases and the applicable 
law
and determine that they can make good Faith arguments in strppar
t of
their clients' positions. Such action is not frivolous even though the law
-
yer believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail. The
 ac-
tion is frivolous, however, if the lawyer is unable either to mak
e ~ good
faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the
 action
taken by ~ good faith argument for ~n extension, modification or re
versal
of existing law.
(3] The lawyer's obligations under this Rule are subordinate to fed-
eral or state constitutional law that entitles a defendant in a criminal 
znat-
ter to the assistance of counsel in presenting a claim or contenti
on that
otherwise would be prohibited by this Rule.
12
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.4DVOCl~1'E Rule 3.3
RULE 3o3e ~AletI30R ` TOWARD THE ~'IZIBUIVAL
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) snake a false statement of fact or law to a Tribunal ox fail
to corxect a false skatement of material fact or law previously
made to the tribunal by the lawyer;
(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority im the
controlling jurisdi~ti~n knor~vn to the lawyer to be direcfly
adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by
opposing counsel; or
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be £else.
If a lawyer, the lawyer's client, or a witness called by
the lawyer, has offered. material evidence and the lavQryer
comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures, including, if necessarq, disclosure to the
tribunal, A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than
the testimony of a defendant in a criminal maftex, that the
lawyer rea~onaToly believes is false.
97
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(b) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative
proceeding and who knows that a person intends fio en
gage,
is engaging or has engaged in cximinal or fraudixlent c
ondixct
related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedia
l
measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tri
bunal.
(c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to
the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if comp
liance
requires disclosure of information othezvvise protect
ed by Rule 1.6.
(d) In an ex pane proceeding, a lawyer shall infoxm the
tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that 
will
enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whe
ther
or not the facts are adverse.
Com.m:ent
[1] Tl1is Rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is represen
ting
a client in the proceedings o£ a tz~ibtznal. See Rule 1.0(m) for th
e defini-
tion of "tribunal." It also applies when the lawyer is repre
senting a client
in an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the tri
bunll's adjudi-
c~tive authority, such as a deposition. Thus, for examp
le, paragraph (a)
(3) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures if th
e lawyer
comes to know that a client who is testifying in a dep
osition has offered
evidence that is false.
[2] This Rule sets foxth the special duties of lawyers as officers o
f the
court to avoid conduct that undernnines the integrity of t
he adjudicative
process. A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding
his an oblzg~tion to present the client's case with persua
sive Force. Per-
Eormance of that duty while maintaining confidences of t
he client, how-
ever, is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the trib
~ulal. Conse-
quently, although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is 
not required to
present an impartial exposition of the law or to vouch fo
r the evidence
submitted in a cause, the lawyer must not allow the tri
bunal to be misled
by False statements of law or fact or evidence that the la
wyer knows to be
false.
Representations by a Lawyer
[3] An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other docum
ents
prepared fox litigation, but is usually not required to ha
ve personal
knowledge of matters asserted therein, for litigation do
cuments ordinar-
ily present assertions by the client, or by someone on the
 client's behalf,
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and .not assertions by the lawyer. Compare IZuIe 3.1. However, an asser-
tion purporting to be nn the lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit
by the lawyer ox in a statement in open court, may properly be made only
when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true nn
the basis of a reasonably diligent uzquiry. There are circumstances where
faihire to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative nlisrepre-
sentation. The obligation prescribed in Rule 7..2(d) not to couxlsel a client
to commit or assist the client in committing a fxlud applies in litigation.
Regarding compliance with Rule 1.2(d), see the Comment to that Rule.
See also the Comment to Rule 8.4(b).
.Legal Argument
[4] Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law
constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to
make 1 disinterested exposition of the law, but intrst recognize the exzs-
tezZce of pertinent legal authoz'ities. Furthermore, as stated izZ paragraph
(a)(2), an adtrocate has a duty to disclose directly advexse authority in the
controlling jurisdiction that has not been disclosed by the opposing party.
The underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to
determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case.
Offering Evidence
[5J Paragraph (a)(3) requires that tale lawyer refuse to offer evidence
that the lawyer knows to be false, regardless o£ the client's wishes. This
duty is premised on the 1a~vyer's obligation as an officer o£ the court to
prevent the trier of fact fxom being misled by false evidence. A lawyer
does not violate this TZule if the lawyer offers the evidence for the pur-
pose of establishing its falsity.
[6] If a lawyer knows that the client intends to testify falsely or wants
the lawyer to introduce false evidence, the lawyer should seek to per-
suade the client that the evidence should not be offered. If the pez~suasion
is ineffective and the lawyer continues to represent the client, the lawyer
must refuse to offer the false evidence. If only a portion of a witness's
testimony will be false, the lawyer may call the witness to testify but may
not elicit or otherwise permit the witness to present the testimony that
the lawyer knows is false.
[7] The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) apply to all lawyers,
including defense counsel in criminal uses. IX~ some jurisdictions, how-
ever, coux-ts have required counsel to present the accused as a witness
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or to give a narrative statement if 
the accused so desires, even if coun
sel
knows that the testimony or stat
ement will be False. The obligation 
of the
advocate tinder the Rules of ~'rofe
ssional Conduct is s~.xbordinate to 
such
requirements. See atso Comment
 [9].
(8] The prohibition ~g~.inst offexing fa
lse evidence only applies if the
lawyer knows that the evidence i
s fuse. A lawyer's reasonable belief 
that
evidence is False does not preclude
 its presentation to the trier of fac
t. A
lawyer's knowledge that evidence i
s false, however, can be inferred f
rom
the circumstances. See Rule 1.Q(E). Thu
s, although a lawyer should re
-
solve doubts about the veracifiy of 
testimony or other evidence in fa
vor of
the client, the lawyer cannot ignoa-e
 an obvious falsehood.
[9] Although paragraph (~}(3) only pz-o
hibzts a lawyer from offexing
evidence the lawyer knows to be
 false, it perzn~ts the lawyer to re
fLtse
to offer testimony or other proof 
that the Dwyer reasonably believes
 is
false. Offexing such pxoof may re
flect adversely nn the Iawyex's abil
ity to
discriminate in the c~u~lity of evid
ence az~d thus impair the lawyer'
s e~-
fectiveness as an advocate. Becatics
e of the special protections histo
rically
provided cximinaZ defendants, howe
ver, this RL~le does not permit a 
law-
yer to refuse to offer the testimony o
f such a client where the lawyer r
ea-
sonably believes but does not kr
iow that the testimony will be false. 
Un-
less the lawyer knows the testimo
ny will be false, the 1lwyer most ho
nor
the client's decision to testify. See al
so Comment (7].
Remedial Measures
[10] Hiving offered material eviden
ce in the belief that it was true,
a lawyer may subsequently come t
o know that the evidence is false. 
Or,
a lawyer may be surprised wl~En th
e lawyer's client, or another witnes
s
called by fih.e Iawye.r, offers testimo
ny the la~nryer knows to be false, eit
her
during the lawyer's direct ex~min~
itian or in response to cross-exam
ina-
tion by the apposing lawyer. In sz2
ch situations or if the lawyer know
s of
the falsity of testimony elicited fr
om the client during a deposition, 
the
lawyer must take reasonable re
medial measures. In such situations
, the
a~~ivocate's proper course is to re
monstrate with the client confidentia
lly,
advise the client of the lawyer's 
c1L1ty of candor to the tribunal and 
seek
the client's cooperation with re
spect to the withdrawal or correctio
n of
the false statements or evidence.
 IE that fails, the advocate must tak
e fur-
thex remedial action. Tf withdraw
al from the representation is not per
mit-
tecl or will not undo the effect of
 the false evidence, the advocate m
ust
mike such disclosure to the tribun
al as is reasonably necessary to re
medy
"100
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the situation, even if doing so requires the Dwyer to reveal. information
that otherwise would be protected by Rule 1.6. It is for the tribunal then
to determine what should be done—making a statement about the matter
to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial or perhaps nothing.
[11] The disclosure of a client's false testimony can result in grave
consegLrences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but also
loss of tine case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But Ehe alterna-
tive is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subvert-
ing the truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to
implement. See Rule 1.2(d}. Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood
that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the existence of false ev-
idence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's advice to reveal the false
evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus the client could in
effect coerce the lawyer into being ~ party to fraud on the court.
Preserving Integrity of Adjudicative .d'rocess
[121 Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a tribunal against
criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the ad-
judicative process, such as bribing, izztimidating oz otherwise unlawfully
communicating with a witness, juror, court official or other participant in
the proceeding, unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other
evidence or failing to disclose information to the tribunal when required
by law to clo so. Thus, paragraph (b) xequires a lawyer to tike reasonable
remedial measures, indudi.ng disclosure if necessary, whenever the law-
yer knows that a person, including the lawyex's client, intezzds to engage,
is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to
the proceeding.
Duration of Obligation
[13] A practical time limit on the obligation to rectify false evidence
or false statements of law and fact his to be established. The conclusion
of the proceeding is a reasonably definite point for the tez~nliil~tioz~ of the.
obligation, A proceeding has concluded within the meaning of this Rule
when a final judgment in the proceeding has been. affirmed on appeal or
the time for review has pissed.
Ex PRrte Proceedings
[14] Ordinarily, an advocate 11as the limited responsibility of present-
ing one side of the matters that a tribunal should consider in reaching a
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decision; the conflicting position is expected to be presente
d by the op-
posin~ party. F-Iowever, in azly ex parte proceeding, such as 
an applica-
tion for ~ temporary restraining Dreier, there is no bl.lance 
of pxesentation
by opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte proceeding is neverthe-
less to yield 1 substantially just res~.ilt. The judge has an aE£irnnative re-
sponsibility to accord the absent party just consideration. The lawyer for
the represented party has the correlative duty to make disclo
sures of ma-
terial facts known to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasona
bly believes
are necessary to an informed decision.
Withclrgzval
['15] Normally, a lawyer's compliance with the duty of cand
or im-
posed by this Rule does not require that the lawyer withdr
aw from the
representation of a client whose .interests will be or have be
en adversely
affected by the lawyer's disclosure. The Dwyer may, how
ever, be re-
quired by Rule 1.16(a) to seek permission of the tribLinal to wit
hdraw if
the lawyer's compliance with this Rule's ditty of candor res
ults in such
an extreme deterioration of the client-lawyer relationship tha
t the lawyer
can no longer competently represent the client. E1.Iso see Rul
e 1.16(b) for
the circurnstaxzces in which a lawyer will be permitte
d to seek a tribu-
nal's permission to withdraw. T_rt connection with a request
 for permis-
sion to withdraw that is premised on a client's misconduct
, a lawyer may
reveal information relating to the representation only to th
e extent rea-
sonably necessary to comply with this Rule or as otherwise per
mitted by
Rule 1.6.
Definitional Cross-References
"Fraudulent" See Rule 1.0(d)
"Knowingly" and "Known" and "Knows" See Rule 1.0(f)
"Reasonable" See Rule 1.0(h)
"Reasonably believes" See Rule 1.0(i)
"Tribunal" See Rule 1.0(m)
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~~z~os~~r~ PASTY ~~r~ Courrs~~,
f1 lawyer shall nvt:
(a) unlawfully obstxuet another party's access to evidence or
unlawf~al~y alfier, destroy or conceal a document or other mater
ial
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having potenEial evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel
ox• assist another person to do any such act;
(b) falsify evidence, counsel oz assist a witness to testify
falsely, or offer an inducemeant to a witness that is prohibited
by law;
(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a
tribunal, excepE for an open refusal based on an assertion that
no valid obligation exists;
(d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request
ox fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally
propex discovery request by an opposing party;
(e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not
xeasonably believe is xelevant or that will not be supported
by admissible evidence, assext personal knowledge of facts in
issue except when testifying as a witness, ox state a persoanal
opixliozi as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness,
the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an
accused; or
(f) request a person other than a client to refrain from
voluntarily giving relevant information to another party rix~less:
(1) the person is a relative or an employee or othex agent
of a client; and
{2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's
interests will not be adversely affected by refraining fronn
giving such information.
Comment
[1] The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evi-
dence in a case is to be marshalled competitively by the contending par-
ties. Fair competition in the adversary system is seciued by ~rohibztions
against destruction oz~ concealment of evidence, improperly influencing
witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like.
j2] llocuments and other items of evidence axe often essential to es-
tablish aclaim or def~n5e. Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right of.
an opposing party, including the govez-nment, to obtain evidence thro~xgh
discovery or subpoena is an important procedural right. Th.e exercise of
that right can be frustrated if relevant matexial is altered, concealed or
destroyed. Applicable law in many jurisdictions makes it an offense to
destroy material for purpose of impairing its availability in a pending
proceeding or one whose commencement can be foreseen. Falsifying evz-
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deuce is also generally a criminal offense. Paragraph (a) applies to evi-
cientiary material generally, including computerized information. Appli-
cable law may permit a lawyer to take temporary possession of physical
evidence of client crimes for the purpose of conducting a Limited exam-
ination that wil] not alter or destroy mlterial characteristics of the evi-
dence. Iz1 such a case, appiiclble law may require the lawyer to t~irn the
evidence over to the police or other prosecuting authority, depending on
the circumstances.
[3] With regard to paragraph (b), it is not improper Eo pay a witness's
expenses or to compensate an expert witness on terms permitted by law.
The common .law rule in most jurisdictions is that it is improper to pay an
occurrence witness any fee for testifying and that it is improper to pay an
expert witness a contingent fee.
[4] Paragraph (f) permits a lawyer to advise employees of a client to
refrain from gzving information to another party, for the employees may
identify their interests with those o£ the client. See also Rule 42.
Definitional Cross-References
"Knowingly" See Rule 7.0(t)
"Reasonably" See Rule 1.0(h)
"Reasonably believes" See Rule 1.0(i)
"Tribunal" See Rule 1.0(m)
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(a) A lawyer who is participating or has participated inthe inv~stigafion or litigation of a matter shall not make anextrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonablyshould know will be disseminated by means o£ publiccommunication ax~cl will lave a substantial likelihood ofmaterially prejudicing an adjudicative proceedar~g in tlae mafr~er.(b) Notwithstanding paragz~aph (a), a lawyer may sfate:{1) the claim, offense ar de#erase involved and, exc~~st
when prohibited by law, th.e identify of the p~~sores involved;
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(2) information contained in a public record;
(3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress;
(4) fihe scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and
information necessary thereto;
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a
person involved, when there is reason to believe that there
exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual
or to the public inEerest; and
(7) in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1)
through (6):
(i) the identity, residence, occupation and £amity status
o£ the accused;
(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended,
information necessazy to aid in apprehension of that
person;
{iii) the £act, time and place of arrest; and
(zv) Ehe identity of investigating and arresting officers
or agencies and the length of the investigation.
(c) Notwithstanding paxagraph (a), a lawyer may make a
statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required fo
protect a client fronn the substantial undue prejudicial effect of.
recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer ox the lawyer's client.
A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to
such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse
publicity.
(d) No lawyer associated in a firm or gavernment agency with a
lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited
by paragraph (a).
Cotx~nnent
[1] It is difficult ho strike a balance between protecting the right to
fair trial and safeguarding the night of free expression. Preserving the
right to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the information
that may be disseminated about a party prior to trial, particularly whexe
trial by jury is involved. If there were no such limits, the result wo~i~d be
the practical nullification of the protective effect o.f the rL~les of forensic
decoxum and the exclusionary rules of evidence. On the other hand, there
are vital social interests served by the fxee dissezninatzon of information
about events bluing 1eg11 consequences and about legal proceedings
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themselves. The public lzas a right to know abotrt threats to its safety Ind
treasures aimed at assuring its security. It also has a legitimate interest
in the conduct of judicial. proceedings, particularly in matters of general
public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceedings is
often of direct significance in debate end deliberation over questions of
public policy,
[2] Special rules of confidentiality may validly govern pt•oceedings .in
juvenile, domestic relations end mental disability proceedings, and per-
haps other types of litigation. Rule 3.4(c) regLrires compliance wzth such
rules.
[3) The Rule sets forth a basic general prohibition against a lawyer's
making statements that the lawyer knows or should know will have a
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceed-
in.g. Recognizing that the pLiblic value of informed commentary is great
and the likelihood of prejudice to a proceeding by the commentary of a
lawyer who is not involved in the proceeding is small, the rule applies
only to lawyers who are, or who have been involved in the izlvestigation
or litigation of ~ case, and their associates.
[4] Pax~igra~h (b) identifies specific matters lbout which a lawyer's
statements would not ordinarily be cozzsidereci to present a substantial
likelihood of material prejudice, and should not in any event be consid-
ered prohibited by the general prohibition of paragraph (a). Paragraph
(b) is not intended to be an exhaustive listing of the subjects upon which
a lawyer may make a statement, but statements on other matters may be
subject to paragraph (a).
(5) There are, on the other h1nd, certain subjects t11at are more likely
than not to have ~ material prejudicial effect on a proceeding, particularly
when they refer to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or any
other proceeding that could result in ilzcarceration. "These subjects relate
to:
(1) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a
party, suspect in a cz~iminll investigatiUn or witness, or the identity of
a witness, or the expected testimony of a party c>r witness;
(2) in a criminal case or proceeding that could res~.tl.t in incarcera-
tion, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence
or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a de-
fendant or suspect or that perso.n's refusal or failure to make a st~te-
merlt;
(3) the performance oz results o.f any examination ox test or the re-
107
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Fusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or
 test, ox the
identity or nature of physicll evidence expected to be presente
d;
(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or sus-
pect in a criminal case oz proceeding that could result in i
ncarcera-
tion;
(5) information that the lawyer knows oz reasonably should kn
ow
is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that 
would, if
disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or
(6) the flct that a defendant has been charged with a crime, 
un-
less there zs included therein a statement explaining that
 the charge
is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presume
d innocent
Lultil aild unless proven guilty.
[6] Another relevant factor in determining prejudice is the nature
of the proceeding involved. Criminal jury trials wil] be most sensitive
to extrajudicial speech. Civil trials may be less sensitive. Nonyury hear-
ings and arbitration proceedings may be even less affe
cted. The Rule
will still place limitations on prejudicial comments in these cases, but
the likelihood of prejudice may be different dependizlg ox1 the type of
proceeding.
[7] Finalty, extrajudicial statements that .might otherwise raise a ques-
tion under this Rule may be permissible when they are ma
de in response
to statements made publicly by another party, anothe
r party's lawyer,
oz thzrd persons, where a reasonable lawyer would believe
 a public re-
sponse is required in order to avoid prejudice to the lawyer's client
.
When prejudicial statements have been publicly made by others, respon-
slue statements may have the salutary effect of lessez
zing any resulting
adverse impact nn the adjudicative proceeding. Such responsive state-
ments should be limited to contain only such information
 as is necessary
to mitigate undue prejudice created by the statements made by others.
[8] See Rule 3.8(f) for ldditional duties of prosecutors in connec
tion
with extrajudicial statements about criminal proceedings.
Definitional Cross-References
"Fzrm" See Rule 1.0(c)
"Knows" See Rule 1.0(f)
"Reasonable" See Rule 1.0(h)
"Reasonably should know" See Rule 1.0(j)
"S~.tbst~ntial" See Rule 1.0(1)
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RULE 3e7: LAWYER AS WITNESS
Rule 3.7
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in whic
h the
lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unles
s:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testirztony relates to the nature and value of legal
services rendered in the case; or
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substant
ial
hardship on the client.
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which an
other
lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be calle
d as a witness
unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 ox 
Rule 1.9.
Comment
[1] Combining the roles of advocate and witness ca
n prejudice the
tribtulal and the opposing party and can also invo
lve a conflict of interest
between the lawyer and client.
Advoccste-Witness Rule
[2] The tribunal has proper objection when the trier of fac
t may be
confused or misled by a lawyex serving as bof
h advocate and witness.
The opposing party has proper objection where the coxnUin
ation of roles
may prejudice that party's rights in the litigation. A witness
 is requimd to
testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while 
an advocate is expected
to explazn azzd comment on evidence given by
 others. It may nc~t be clear
whether a statement by an advocate-witness s
ho~.~ld be taken as proof or
as an analysis of the proof.
[3] To protect the tribunal, paragraph (a) prohibits a
 lawyer from si-
multaneously serving as advocate and necessar
y witness except in those
circumstances specified in paragraphs (a)(1) thro
ugh (a)(3). Paragraph
(a)(1) recognizes that if the testimony will be unco
ntested, the ambigui-
ties in the dual role are purely theoretical. P
aragraph (a)(2) recognizes
that where the testimony concerns the exte
nt and value of legal services
rendered in the action in which the testimon
y is offered, permitting the
lawyers to testify avoids the need for a se
cond trial with new counsel to
resolve that issue. Moreover, in such a situat
ion the judge has firsthand
knowledge of the matter in issue; hence, th
ere is less dependence on the
adversary process to test the credibility of the 
testimony.
[4] Apart from these two exceptions, paragraph (a)
(3) recognizes that
a balancing is requuired between the interests
 of the client and those of
109
26
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 9 [2014], Art. 33
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss9/33
Role 39 ABA MODEL RULES
the tribunal and the opposing party. Whether the trib~mal is likely to be
misled or the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice depends on the
nature of the case, the importance end probable terror of the lawyer's tes-
timony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict with
that of other witnesses. Even if there is Xisk of such prejudice, in deter-
mining whether tl~e 1lwyez should be disqualified, clue reglyd must be
given to the effect of disc~uali£ication on the lawyer's client. It is relevant
that one or both parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would
probably be a witness. The conflict of interest principles stated in Rules
1.7, 1.9 and 1.10 have nn application to this aspect of the problem.
[5] Because the tribunal is not likely to be misled when a lawyer acts
as advocate in a trial in which azlother lawyer iz1 the lawyer's firm will
testify as a necessary witness, paragraph (b) permits the lawyer to do so
except in situations involving a conflict o£ interest.
Conflict of InteYest
[6] In determining if it is permissible to act as advocate in a trial in
which the lawyex will be a necessary witness, the 1lwyer m~rst also con-
sider that the dual xole may give rise to a conflict of interest that will re-
\ quire compliance with .Rules 1.7 or 1.9. Fbr example, if there is likely to
be substantial conflict between the testimony of the client and that of the
lawyer the representation involves a conflict of interest that requires com-
pliance with Rule 1.7. This would be true even though the lawyer might
not be prohibited by paragraph (a) fxom simultaneously serving as advo-
cate and witness because the lawyer's disqualification would work a sttb-
stantial hardship on the client. Similarly, a lawyer who might be permit-
ted to simultaneously sexve as an advocate and a witness by paragraph
(a)(3) might be precluded from doing so by Rule 1.9. The problem can
arise whether the lawyer is c111ed as ~ witness on behalf of the client ar is
called by the opposing party. Determining whether or not such a conflict
exists is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer involved. If there is a
conflict of interest, the lawyer must secLire the client's informed consent,
confirmed in writing. In some cases, tl~e lawyer will be precluded from
seeking the client's consent. See Rule 1.7. See Rule 1.0(b) for the definition
of "confirmed in writing" and Rule 1.0(e) £ox the definition of "informed
consent."
[7] Paragraph (b) provides that a lawyer is not disqualified from
serving ~s an advocate because a lawyex with whom the lawyer is associ-
ated in a firm is preclLlded from. doing so by paragraph (a). If, however,
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the testifying lawyer would also be disqualified by Rule 1.7 or Rule 7.9
£rom representing the client in the matter, other lawyers in the Iirm will
be precluded from representing the client by Rule 1.10 unless the client
gives informed consent under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.
Defar~ifz~nal Crass-13eferences
"Firm" See Rule 1.0(c)
"Substantial" See Rule 1.0(1)
- '~ ~_. ,~.._ ~~.,, ~-r.~~
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